University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
NotiSur

Latin America Digital Beat (LADB)

1-7-1994

Analysis: Kingpin's Death May Restrain Colombian
Drug War
Guest Author

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur
Recommended Citation
Guest Author. "Analysis: Kingpin's Death May Restrain Colombian Drug War." (1994). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur/
11305

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NotiSur by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu.

LADB Article Id: 57092
ISSN: 1060-4189

Analysis: Kingpin's Death May Restrain Colombian Drug
War
by Guest
Category/Department: Colombia
Published: 1994-01-07
[The following article is reproduced with permission of the Washington-based Council on
Hemispheric Affairs (COHA). It was published in the Dec. 24, 1993 edition of COHA's biweekly
publication, "Washington Report on the Hemisphere."]
December 2 was the height of the official rejoicing set off when Colombian security forces gunned
down notorious cocaine baron Pablo Escobar (see NotiSur 12/03/93). Even though this was the
most visible success in over a decade and- a-half of the US-backed campaign against traffickers in
the country, officials in Bogota and Washington were quick to concede that the northward flow of
cocaine would not be noticeably affected.
Over the preceding two years, Escobar's Medellin cartel already had ceded the lion's share of its
business to rival traffickers based in Cali, who controlled 80% of the world's cocaine as of early
this year. It was only in his weakened condition, and with extensive cooperation from Washington
and Cali-backed paramilitary hit squads, that Colombia's joint military and police "Bloque de
busqueda" was able to get their hands on Escobar at all. Official wisdom holds that the success of
the manhunt which began after Escobar's July 1992 prison escape and cost well over a hundred lives
is an intimidating signal to other trafficking organizations that Colombia can indeed enforce its laws.
A more likely scenario is, however, that the end of their nine-year confrontation with Escobar will
allow authorities to cement the de facto truce with Cali and complete a quiet retreat, begun in 1990,
from what always has been perceived as Washington's struggle. The real fallout from Escobar's
demise may hinge on how well Bogota walks the fine line between keeping a tenuous peace with
surviving cartel CEO's, yet avoid threatening the ongoing flow of US counterinsurgency funds
provided to the war on drugs.

Legalize It?
Exacerbating US fears that Colombia might be opting for a kinder, gentler approach, highly
respected Attorney General Gustavo de Greiff who recently asserted that legalization is the only
final solution to the international drug problem is currently negotiating with Cali leaders over their
offer to surrender en masse and voluntarily dismantle their vertically integrated empire in exchange
for lenient sentencing and the right to keep illicitly-gained fortunes.
Numerous critics in Washington and Bogota, including Colombian Federal Prosecutor Carlos
Arrieta, have argued that cartel lawyers played a decisive role in drafting the new penal code that
grants prosecutors leverage to engage in broad-gauge plea-bargaining. It is also clear that even
if Cali honored its pledge, the arrangement would do nothing to prevent other traffickers from
immediately filling the void. The permissive penal code is only Colombia's most recent move in a
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clear pattern of compromise with narcotraffickers. After assuming office in 1990, President Cesar
Gaviria extended an olive branch by offering traffickers lenient sentencing, no confiscation of
assets and immunity from extradition to the US, in exchange for voluntary surrender. The country's
revised 1991 constitution explicitly prohibits extradition, which traffickers had rebelled against since
the mid-1980's, with a string of assassinations and kidnappings. Governmental largess was broad
enough to accommodate even Escobar, who in June 1991 "surrendered" into the luxurious prison
that became his operational headquarters for over a year.
Official declarations aside, Washington antinarcotics personnel acknowledge that the intense
Escobar manhunt was probably an aberration in Colombian policy, made possible only by his
singular notoriety as the sponsor of literally hundreds of killings of prominent Colombians, and
the government's humiliation at his prison escape. Even with a US mandate, it seems unlikely that
Bogota anti-drug hard-liners possess the critical political mass to draw Colombians into another
round of bloodletting to combat cocaine.

Drug wars in D.C.
The Clinton administration's surprisingly hawkish drug control strategy is being hacked down at the
knees by Congress' unyielding budget cuts. Even after congressional rhetoric began reflecting the
solid academic consensus backed up by over a decade of evidence from US filed operatives that the
interdiction and source-control strategies of the 1980's were little more than futile, the President's
initial budget proposal still left Reagan-Bush funding priorities virtually intact.
Last October, Senate subcommittees tore apart drug czar Lee Brown's interim drug control strategy,
which neglected any mention of budgeting levels, deferred Clinton's highly touted demandingreduction proposals to the health-care package, and somewhat perversely promised to move away
from interdiction in favor of the source-control efforts that Congress recently had concluded are
even less productive. Budget cuts, reflecting congressional skepticism, have been especially deep
in the well-established assistance channels that have allowed the US to finance, train and equip
foreign police and soldiers with virtually no legislative scrutiny.
The final FY 1994 budget enactment reduces the State Department's International Narcotics Matters
budget by one-third, shrinking Colombia's share from $25 million to $20 million. Drug-related
military training and financing funds have been slashed from Clinton's proposed $52 million
which would have boosted Colombia's share to $32 million (a $4 million increase over the last Bush
administration package) to a paltry $13 million of which over one-half is earmarked for Bogota.
Human rights violations resurface The congressional cuts barely preceded new reports alleging
that Colombia's security forces have continued to engage in the systemic abuse of human rights
including torture, disappearances and executions without trial in their war against leftist guerilla
groups. The information also refreshes accusations, levelled by various observers throughout
the 1980's that perhaps the bulk of US military support for antinarcotics campaigns is diverted to
counterinsurgency efforts, and that Cali cartel-financed rightist paramilitaries may continue to
operate with the sanction, if not the outright collaboration, of the regular army.
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